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MARYLAND'S APPLICATION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BIDDING DISPUTES: ELIMINATING 
FURTHER CONFUSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between general contractors and subcontractors in 
the construction industry bidding process! has long presented a 
unique problem to the law of contracts.2 In any multi-level bidding 
system, such as construction projects, parties must rely on each other's 
estimates in order to accurately submit bids.3 This places parties at 
risk when an error is discovered or one side refuses to perform and 
inevitably leads to one party bearing a financial 10ss.4 Recognizing 
these risks and seeking to prevent the resulting injustice, courts apply 
promissory estoppel,5 among other methods,6 to the construction bid-
ding process.7 This doctrine has the potential to protect, (1) the gen-
eral contractor from subcontractors attempting to escape a quoted 
price,s and (2) subcontractors from general contractors attempting to 
shop for lower estimates after the main contract has been awarded.9 
1. See infra Part ILA 
2. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL AsPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS § 28.01, at 620 (5th ed. 1994). 
3. Id. at 623. 
4. See infra Part II.B. 
5. Although the term "promissory estoppel" has frequently been labeled a 
misnomer, it is widely used to describe the theory that protects unbar-
gained for reliance. Despite Maryland courts' use of the term "detrimental 
reliance," this Comment will adhere to the more widely used term "promis-
sory estoppel." E.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 
146 n.1, 674 A2d 521, 523 n.1 (1996) (referring to the theory of promis-
sory estoppel as detrimental reliance). 
6. See infra Part N (discussing alternatives to promissory estoppel in solving 
bid disputes). 
7. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958) (apply-
ing promissory estoppel to make a subcontractor's bid irrevocable after dis-
covery of an error). See also infra Part IILB for a discussion of the 
application of promissory estoppel to the construction industry bidding 
process. 
8. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
9. See Thomas P. Lambert, Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcon-
tract Construction Industry, 18 UClA L. REv. 389, 405-09 (1965) (noting that 
promissory estoppel can be used to bind the general contractor to the sub-
contractor, not just vice versa); see also infra Part III.B.3.h. 
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Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel,Io its application in construction bidding dis-
putes remains unclear. 1 1 By misunderstanding the rationale behind 
the doctrine's use and creating additional requirements,I2 the court 
ignored cases interpreting the standard and inappropriately applied 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. I3 
This Comment analyzes Maryland's application of promissory estop-
pel to construction bidding disputes between general contractors and 
subcontractors. I4 In order to fully understand and analyze the correct 
use of promissory estoppel in construction bidding, Part II of this 
Comment examines the bidding process, its unique features, the ac-
tors involved, and the difficulties the process poses to contract law. 15 
Part III addresses the emergence and evolution of promissory estop-
pel,I6 both nationally and in Maryland, and its more recent applica-
tion to the construction bidding scenario. I7 In addition, Part III 
analyzes Maryland's misinterpretation of the Restatemenf8 and pro-
vides suggestions as to how the Court of Appeals of Maryland can rec-
tify the current situation.19 Part IV explores the viability of potential 
alternatives in establishing a balance between the rights and needs of 
general contractors and subcontractors.2o This Comment concludes 
by suggesting that the court of appeals clarify its interpretation of 
promissory estoppel, thereby permitting the doctrine's use as a solu-
tion to the construction industry's bidding dilemma.21 
II. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BIDDING 
As the construction industry employs a unique bidding process 
prior to contract formation, it continuously challenges contract law to 
respond with innovative solutions.22 Most disputes involving bidding 
arise because of a mistake in a bid or an attempt by a general contrac-
lO. See infra Part III.A.4. 
11. See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part III.C.2. 
13. See infra Part III.C.2. 
14. See infra Part II.A (discussion the unique construction industry bidding 
process). 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III.A. 
17. See infra Part III.B. 
18. See infra Part III.C. 
19. See infra Part III.C.2. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. SWEET, supra note 2, at 620. 
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tor to "bid shop."23 The most volatile area of this process is the rela-
tionship between the general contractor, who manages the project, 
and the subcontractors, who complete the parts of the project in 
which they specialize.24 This relationship has led subcontracting to be 
labeled the "legal Achilles' heel of the Construction Process."25 Nev-
ertheless, if functioning properly, subcontracting can reduce the costs 
of construction by promoting competition among general contractors 
and subcontractors, and increase the efficiency of the process through 
specialization.26 
A. The Unique Bidding Process 
In the construction industry, contract formation usually occurs 
through the bidding process.27 In virtually all construction projects, 
the following three parties are involved: (1) the landowner, project 
developer or government agency who requests parties to submit esti-
mates for the construction of the project; (2) the general contractor, 
who submits bids on the construction of the entire project; and (3) 
the subcontractors, who submit estimates to the general contractor on 
a particular part of the project in which they specialize.28 
Given this arrangement, two levels of bids are usually submitted on 
all construction projects.29 At the upper level, the landowner, project 
23. BRIAN M. SAMUELS, CONSTRUCTION LAw §§ 6.3-.4, at 69-70 (1996) (giving a 
brief description of mistakes and bid shopping in construction industry bid-
ding). For a definition of "bid shopping," see infra note 45 and accompany-
ing text. 
24. See id. § 6.2, at 66. 
25. SWEET, supra note 2, at 620. 
26. See id. (stating that the principal advantage of the subcontracting system is 
the resulting improvement in efficiency). 
27. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 66. The award of the contract constitutes the 
acceptance of the offer and establishes contractual rights between the 
owner or solicitor of bids and the successful general contractor. Id. at 68. 
The prices submitted by the subcontractors and other suppliers, which 
were relied upon by the general contractor in computing the main bid, are 
irrevocable once acceptance occurs. Id. This contrasts with an earlier stage 
in the bidding process where a subcontractor's bid may be irrevocable, not 
because the main bid was accepted, but because the general contractor re-
lied on the bid under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See infra notes 
193-213 and accompanying text. 
28. Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 533-34, 369 A.2d 1017, 
1020-21 (1977) (citing John B. Gaides, The "Firm Offer" Problem in Construc-
tion Bids and the Need for Promissory Estoppel, 10 WM. & MARy L. REv. 212 
(1968)). 
29. Michael L. Closen & Donald G. Weiland, The Construction Industry Bidding 
Cases: Application of Traditional Contract, Promissory },Stoppel, and Other Theories 
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developer, or government agency solicits bids from general contrac-
tors.30 This type of bid includes the estimated cost for the entire pro-
ject.3l At the second level, subcontractors submit bids to the general 
contractors.32 These bids contain price estimates for the subcontrac-
tor's performance of a specific sub-part of the project paralleling the 
subcontractor's area of expertise.33 
Both levels of bid submission are generally initiated when, at the 
upper level, the landowner, project developer, or government agency 
invites or solicits bids for a project.34 The method of bid invitation or 
solicitation may vary depending on the nature of the project. For ex-
ample, in Maryland, government agency project bids are solicited by 
public notice or invitations for bids,35 while in non-public projects, 
owners and developers use whatever method of communication is 
available. 36 
to the Relations Between General Contractars and Subcontractars, 13 J. MARsHALL 
L. REv. 565, 568 (1980). 
30. Id. General contractors, also known as prime contractors, do not actually 
perform the work, "but rather coordinate and supervise the project and the 
work of each individual subcontractor and supplier." Id. 
31. Id. However, sometimes large projects are broken down into individual seg-
ments.ld. 
32. Id. 
33. See SWEET, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing the common use of sub-bids in 
the "mechanical specialty trades"). 
34. Id. In the private sector, most invitations to potential bidders contain a 
statement that the owner reserves the right to accept or reject any bid at its 
sole discretion, thereby protecting the owner against liability for improper 
rejection of a bid. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 66. 
35. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (1998). This section 
states: 
Id. 
(1) A unit shall give public notice of an invitation for bids before 
bid opening in accordance with this subsection. 
(2) A unit shall give reasonable notice that shall be at least 10 days 
before the bid opening. 
(3) The unit shall publish notice in the Contract Weekly at least 20 
days before bid opening if: (i) the procurement officer reasonably 
expects bid prices to exceed $25,000 .... 
(4) In addition to any notice required under this subsection, a unit 
may publish notice of an invitation for bids: (i) in the Contract 
Weekly ... (ii) on a bid board; or (iii) in a newspaper, periodical, 
or trade journal. 
36. See Closen & Weiland, supra note 29, at 569 (stating that owners and devel-
opers use advertisements, trade newspapers, magazines, individual invita-
tions to known contractors, and word-of-mouth to solicit bids). 
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Once notice of the project occurs, interested subcontractors - ei-
ther on their own initiative or at a general contractor's request - pre-
pare an estimate on a specific part of the project and then submit a 
bid to one or many general contractors bidding on the project.37 
Commonly, interested subcontractors are required to submit written, 
sealed bids,38 which must arrive at a specified time. The subcontrac-
tors' original bids are followed by price quotes, which are usually re-
layed only a few hours before the main bid for the project is due.39 
The general contractor evaluates the many bids it receives from the 
subcontractors for every part of the project and compiles a total bid 
for the soliciting party based on the individual quotes.40 Mter receiv-
ing bids from a number of general contractors, the party soliciting 
bids awards the contract to the lowest reputable bidderY 
B. Bid Shopping and Bid Peddling 
Common law left the general contractor and subcontractor unpro-
tected from practices detrimental to both parties,42 as both remained 
uncommitted until the general contractor's formal acceptance of the 
sulrbid.43 These practices included "bid shopping" and "bid ped-
dling."44 Bid shopping occurs when the general contractor uses a low 
bid already received to induce other subcontractors into submitting 
lower bids,45 while bid peddling occurs when subcontractors attempt 
37. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 67. 
38. See, e.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A.S.Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 162, 674 A.2d 
521,530 (1996) (stating that an offer under seal is a substitute for consider-
ation to make an offer firm). 
39. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 67. To prevent a general contractor from using 
a quoted price to negotiate lower sub-bids, subcontractors submit their bids 
as late as practicable. [d. This last minute rush is the reason for many mis-
takes by both general contractors and subcontractors in the calculation of 
bids. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625. 
40. SWEET, supra note 2, at 623-24. 
4l. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 68. Factors considered in awarding a contract, 
other than the price of the bid, are the reputation of the lowest bidder and 
its ability to perform quality work. [d. 
42. See, e.g., infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
43. Lambert, supra note 9, at 389 (citing 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS §§ 22-94 (rev. ed. 1963); see also infra notes 158-60 and accom-
panying text. 
44. Lambert, supra note 9, at 389. 
45. [d. at 394. These post-award negotiation tactics are often referred to as "bid 
chopping" and "bid chiseling" and may even be used before the main bid is 
submitted. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625. 
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to under bid the submitted prices of known competitors in order to 
obtain the subcontract from the general contractor.46 
Bid shopping and bid peddling have long been recognized as un-
ethical by construction industry trade organizations, as these practices 
undermined the public benefits of the bidding processY Although 
considered unethical, these practices remain common and have detri-
mental effects.48 The consequences of these practices can be quite 
severe to the owner or developer of a project, the general contractor, 
the subcontractors, and the public.49 For example, "[w]hen successful 
this practice places a profit squeeze on subcontractors, impairing their 
incentive and ability to perform to their best ... ."50 Therefore, it is 
understandable why a remedy such as promissory estoppel51 is neces-
sary in such an environment to inhibit these harmful practices and 
bring stability and predictability to the process. 52 
III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was created to eliminate any 
injustice that may result when a party relies on a promise unsupported 
by a binding contract.53 Courts often perceive a promisor's refusal to 
perform as an injustice, particularly when a person incurs substantial 
46. Lambert, supra note 9, at 394. 
47. See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 69. These practices are considered unethical 
to the point that if a general contractor participates in bid shopping, it may 
lose its right to hold the subcontractor to its bid. This is generally the rem-
edy given as there is no judicial remedy to date. Id. 
48. See SWEET, supra note 2, at 625. 
49. Id. Subcontractors assert that other subcontractors who bid peddle save 
considerable expenses by not preparing their own bids and, therefore, are 
at a distinct advantage. Id. The practice of bid shopping compels subcon-
tractors to wait until the last minute to submit their sub-bids to the general 
contractor, which arguably is the cause for many mistakes. Id.; see also supra 
note 39. Also, because subcontractors feel they must pad, or "puff," their 
bids to be in a better position for post-award negotiations, an inflated bid is 
often relied upon by the general contractor. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625. 
This has the end result of raising the cost of the project for the owner or 
the public. Id. 
50. Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 981 n.7 (Cal. 
1969) (noting that the purpose of the California statute at issue was to pro-
tect the public and subcontractors from the results of bid shopping and bid 
peddling subsequent to the award of a contract). 
51. See infra Part III for a discussion of promissory estoppel. 
52. See infra Part III.B.2. 
53. See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,Jr., The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936) (discussing the reason for protection 
of the reliance interest). 
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expense in reliance on a promise. 54 Instead of denying enforcement 
for lack of consideration, courts enforce the promise if necessary to 
avoid injury to the party who justifiably relied on the promise by in-
voking recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 55 
This doctrine has been described as "an attempt by the courts to 
keep remedies abreast of increased moral consciousness of honest 
and fair representations in all business dealings."56 The flexibility of 
the doctrine is invaluable in the unique situation of the construction 
industry bidding process57 and can, if properly applied, be used as a 
method to protect both general contractors and subcontractors 
against risks.58 
A. The Doctrine's Origins 
Derived from several court opinions that did not adhere to the 
traditional contract requirement of consideration,59 the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is one of the most significant developments in 
contract law of the twentieth century.60 In order to avoid the injustice 
that would result by application of traditional contract theory, mod-
ern courts created ~e legal fiction of promissory estoppel.61 
54. See Michael B. Metzger & MichaelJ. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance 
on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. LJ. 841, 848-49 (1990). 
55. Id. at 848; if. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT § 4, at 88 (1974) 
(concluding that the use of promissory estoppel as a substitute for the or-
thodox contract law requirement of bargained-for consideration has led to 
the death of the contract). 
56. People's Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 12, 
16 (Ark. 1951) (holding that the defendant was estopped from denying 
promissory representations contained in a letter to a bank). 
57. See supra Part I1.A. 
58. Janine McPeters Murphy, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractars' Liability in Con-
struction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 387, 394-95 (1985); see also infra Part 
I1LB.3.b. 
59. See JOHN D. CALAMAru & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 6-1 
(3d ed. 1987) (citing Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from 
Precedents, 50 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1952)). 
60. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Prolifera-
tion ofPromissoryEstoppe~ 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1981) (noting the prolifera-
tion of promissory estoppel in the twentieth century). 
61. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppe~ 49 HAs-
TINGS LJ. 1191, 1196 (1998). 
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1. Historical Roots 
Promissory estoppel has historical roots in both the common-law 
action of assumpsif>2 and early equity decisions.63 Its beginnings fol-
lowed the development of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 64 None-
theless, these two theories are distinctly different.65 Traditionally, 
equitable estoppel has been limited to defensive uses66 and invoked 
only where one party falsely represented a fact and another party suf-
fered injury as a result of relying on that false representation.67 In 
such cases, courts following this doctrine bar the party who made the 
false representation from contradicting it.68 As this doctrine did not 
apply solely by a promisee's reliance on a promise, but rather by reli-
ance on a fraudulently made promise,69 a need for the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel arose.70 
62. See SAMUEL J. STOLjAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAw 37-38 
(1975) (stating that at early common law, when a person incurred injury by 
justifiably relying on another, assumpsit became the prime action for enforc-
ing the informal contract). 
63. See James Barr Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15 
(1888) (explaining that equity gave relief to a plaintiff who incurred detri-
ment on the faith of a defendant's promise). 
64. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2. The doctrine of equitable estop-
pel precludes a person by his act, conduct, or silence, from asserting a right 
he normally had, when it is his duty to act. BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 538 
(6th ed. 1990). 
65. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2. 
66. Robert Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 
YALE LJ. 343, 377-78 (1969). 
67. See Clark v. Nat'l Aid Life Ass'n, 57 P.2d 832 (Okla. 1936). There, the plain-
tiff argued equitable estoppel to estop the defendant from denying the ex-
istence of an insurance contract. Id. at 833. The defendant responded 
arguing that because plaintiff was in poor health at the time of contracting, 
and a valid contract was conditioned on plaintiff's certification of good 
health, there was no valid contract. Id. at 834. The defendant's agent, how-
ever, falsely represented to the plaintiff that the health certification provi-
sion did not apply. Id. at 833. The plaintiff, in good faith, relied upon the 
agent's misrepresentation in transferring his insurance to the defendant, 
resulting in estoppel of defendant's denial of the contract. Id. at 834. 
68. See id. at 835. 
69. See Barnett v. Walfolk, 140 S.E.2d 466, 472 (W. Va. 1965) (recognizing that 
"there can be no estoppel in the 'absence of fraud or intentional wrong' on 
the part of the person to be estopped") (quoting Spradling v. Spradling, 
190 S.E. 537, 541 (W. Va. 1937)). 
70. See generally Henderson, supra note 66. 
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2. The Birth of Promissory Estoppel 
Originally, a promise was unenforceable absent consideration, even 
if the promisee relied on the promise detrimentally.71 Courts argued 
that the presence of consideration was necessary to ensure that a per-
son made the promise after sufficient deliberation.72 Courts began, 
however, to make specific exceptions for certain donative promises,73 
as they recognized the reliance interest needed protection.74 Dona-
tive promises were often enforced as long as "the underlying transac-
tion could be artificially construed as a bargain."75 Nonetheless, 
despite these exceptions, unbargained for promises were generally 
unenforceable. 76 
3. Evolution of Promissory Estoppel in the Restatements of 
Contracts 
a. The Promulgation of Section 90 by Restatement (First) 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was formally introduced into 
contract law by Professor Samuel Williston through the creation of the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts ("Restatement (First),,).77 Notwithstanding 
the emphasis of the Restatement (First) on the bargain theory of consid-
eration,78 its section 90 changed contract law to allow unbargained-for 
71. See CAi.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-1. Generally, the presence of 
consideration was a necessity to valid contract formation to "insure that the 
promise was made with sufficient deliberation." Id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. § 6-2; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 
FORDHAM L. REv. 303, 304 (1992). These exceptions were created to avoid 
injustice for promises made in contemplation of marriage, promises made 
between relatives, gratuitous promises to give land, and charitable subscrip-
tions. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2. 
74. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 53, at 52. The promisee should be afforded 
protection under the law where his position changed based on reliance of 
the promise. Id. 
75. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1979) 
(citing Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923)). 
76. Id. 
77. Section 90 provided: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character 
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). 
78. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. 
REv. 640,657 (1982) (noting that the Restatement (First) adhered to the bar-
gain theory in terms, but limited it in section 90). 
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promises to be binding.79 However, the section's authors intended it 
to enforce relied upon donative promises, rather than promises in a 
commercial context.80 Section 90's definition of promissory estoppel 
required a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
lead to the promisee's act or forbearance.81 Not only must there be a 
promise, but the reliance of the promisee must have been of a "defi-
nite and substantial character."82 
h. The Revision of Section 90 and Creation of Section 87 by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts 
As a result of a number of decisions concerning promissory estop-
pel and the confusion and problems created,83 section 90 was refor-
mulated by the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
("Restatement (Second),,).84 The requirement in the Restatement (First) 
that the action in reliance be of "definite and substantial character" 
was eliminated in the Restatement (Second).85 Language was added that 
permitted flexibility of remedy by enforcing a promise reasonably re-
lied upon to the extent of the reliance.86 Therefore, although section 
79. See Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643, 
656 (1933) (noting that section 90 is notorious "as representing some mod-
ification of the ancient rules of consideration"). 
80. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 73. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. See infra Part III.B.1; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 
(1932). In order to meet this requirement the promise must be one that 
contemplated and induced a particular act in reliance. Id. 
84. The new section of the Restatement (Second) entitled "Promise Reasonably 
Inducing Action or Forbearance" states: 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding 
under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced ac-
tion or forbearance. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 90 (1979). 
85. Id. However, comment b to section 90 states that the definite and substan-
tial nature of the reliance remains one of the factors to be considered and, 
although not needed in charitable subscription cases, must be present in 
cases of firm offers and guarantees. Id., cmt. b. 
86. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-6. The Restatement (Second) thus 
provides not only for flexibility as to the substantive doctrine itself but also 
for a flexible approach regarding remedies. See id.; see also id. § 6-1. 
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90 originally applied only to enforce gratuitous promises,87 the broad~ 
ened scope of section 90 allowed courts to apply promissory estoppel 
to other situations.88 
In addition to changing section 90, the American Law Institute, in 
response to a prominent construction case89 and seeking to make 
promissory estoppel more readily applicable to the construction bid~ 
ding process, created section 87(2).90 This new section, entitled the 
"option contract,"91 allowed promissory estoppel to apply to reliance 
on unaccepted offers where the drafters believed application of sec~ 
tion 90 would be inappropriate.92 Section 87(2) provides that reli~ 
87. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 53, at 52. Gratuitous promises are defined "as 
[ ] promise[s] not supported by consideration." BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 
1229 (7th ed. 1999). 
88. See, e.g., Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Med. Servs. Ass'n, 628 F.2d 820, 
824-25 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a promise by an insurer's employee to 
pick up a bid proposal, which the company relied upon to its detriment, 
was enforceable on the basis of promissory estoppel); Mesa Petroleum Co. 
v. Coniglio, 629 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying promissory es-
toppel to estop a corporation from denying the promise to pay a joint ven-
ture corporation pursuant to a promissory note). But seeJames Baird Co. v. 
Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding that a merchant was 
not liable for damages under promissory estoppel for withdrawing an offer 
to a general contractor of prices for linoleum after the general contractor 
had made a bid on the basis of the prices offered). 
89. See infra Part I1I.B.2. 
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979). This section states: 
(1) An offer is binding as an option contract if it (a) is in writing 
[d. 
91. [d. 
and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the 
making of the offer, and proposes an exchange in fair terms within 
a reasonable time; or (b) is made irrevocable by statute. (2) An 
offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree 
before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to 
avoid injustice. 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. e (1981) (stating that sec-
tion 87 extends the application of section 90 to reliance on an unaccepted 
offer with qualifications where it would be inappropriate to apply section 
90); see also James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346 (refusing to apply section 90 of 
the Restatement (First) to a construction bidding dispute). Section 87(2) was, 
in essence, a codification of the holding of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. See 
infra notes 16~8 and accompanying text. In fact, the situation in Drennan 
was used as an illustration in the comments to section 87(2) of the Restate-
ment (Second). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, illus. 6 (1981). 
182 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
ance on an offer may create an option contract that precludes 
revocation even if the offeror has not actually promised to keep the 
offer open.93 Thus, the subcontractor's bid contains a subsidiary im-
plied promise to hold the bid open.94 Reliance on this implied prom-
ise to keep a sub-bid open occurs when the general contractor uses 
the subcontractor's bid in computing the main bid.95 Therefore, this 
new section creates an exception to the traditional rule that an offeror 
remains free to revoke an offer absent a bargain to keep the offer 
open.96 
c. The Differences Between Sections 90 and 87(2) Limit the Situations Where 
Each is Applicable 
Unlike section 90, the application of section 87 (2) requires reliance 
of a "definite and substantial character."97 This level of reliance is 
similar to that required under the original section 90,98 but is not nec-
essary under section 90 of the Restatement (Second).99 In addition, while 
application of section 90 creates an enforceable contract,lOO section 
87 (2) only makes an offer irrevocable. lol Therefore, a general con-
tractor's reliance on the implied subsidiary promise makes the bid ir-
revocable, but does not yet create a contract between the 
subcontractor and the general contractor. 102 
Despite the drafters' intention that section 87(2) replace the use of 
section 90 in construction bidding cases, few courts have actually ap-
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1979). 
94. See id. 
95. See id. This concept results from the marriage of two contract theories: the 
option contract and promissory estoppel. See supra notes 90-92 and accom-
panying text. 
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, Reporter's Note (1979); see 
also Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel 
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE LJ. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing 
the development of section 87(2». 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 cmt. e. The comment states 
that under certain circumstances the promisee may have to "undergo sub-
stantial expense, or undertake substantial commitments, or forego alterna-
tives, in order to put himself in a position to accept by either promise or 
performance." Id. This reliance must be foreseeable as well as substantial. 
Id. 
98. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 84. 
101. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
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plied section 87(2).103 Nonetheless, a majority of courts apply the rea-
soning behind section 87(2) to construction bidding disputes 104 by 
citing section 90 and the analyses of later case law.lOs 
4. The Birth of Promissory Estoppel in Maryland 
Originally, promissory estoppel was a narrow exception to the gen-
eral requirement of consideration and applied only in cases dealing 
with "gratuitous agencies and bailments."106 The development of 
promissory estoppel in Maryland mirrors its development nation-
wide.107 In 1854, Gittings v. Mayhew108 first addressed the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in Maryland. In Gittings, a charitable fund in-
curred advances, expenses, and liabilities as a result of voluntary sub-
scriptions to the fund used to benefit the community for the 
construction of a building. 109 The court noted in dictum that 
promises are obligatory, provided the advances, expenses, and liabili-
ties incurred by the fund are authorized by fair and reasonable reli-
ance on the promiseYo The dictum in Gittings,lll together with a 
103. Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 159,674 A2d 521, 529 
(1996). Although section 87(2) has been in existence for over 18 years, no 
court has based a decision on it. Gregory Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 508, 521, 544-46 (1998). In fact, one study has found that 
only 21 cases even cite section 87(2). Id. Although none of these cases 
rejected the section or referred to it negatively, they failed to rely solely on 
it in reaching their holdings. Id. at 521. 
104. See infra note 190. 
105. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
106. Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678, 
680 (1983); see also Pavel Enters., 342 Md. at 164, 674 A2d at 531-32 (stating 
that the early cases which applied promissory estoppel mainly involved the 
enforcement of charitable pledges). 
107. SeeJason R. Scherr, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996, 56 MD. L. REv. 711, 719 
(1997) (discussing the origins of promissory estoppel in Maryland). 
108. 6 Md. 113 (1854). 
109. Id. at 131-32. The term "subscription" is defined as "the affixing [of] one's 
signature to any document ... for the purpose ... of adopting its terms as 
one's own expressions." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). In 
the instant case, the subscription is analogous to a promise. 
110. Id. at 131-32. The judgment of the lower court upholding the validity of 
the pledge was reversed on the ground that the plaintiff was not the proper 
person to bring a claim. Id. at 134. The validity of the pledge was only 
discussed because it was of interest to the community and had been ad-
dressed by counsel. Id. at 130. 
111. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
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number of subsequent decisions dealing more directly with the issue 
of reliance by the court of appeals,112 became the law in Maryland. 
Eventually, the court in Maryland National Bank v. United Jewish Ap-
peal Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. 113 expressly adopted section 
90 of the Restatement (First)Y4 The court, however, held that the plain-
tiff did not prove reliance as required by the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. l15 In that case, an individual pledged $200,000 to the 
United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. (UJA) , 
which was never paid.116 The court, in applying the Restatement 
(First),117 held that the defendant's pledge to a charitable institution 
was unenforceable as a gratuitous promise, because the UJA had not 
acted in a "definite and substantial" manner in reliance on the 
pledge. 118 By following the reasoning of earlier Maryland courts, the 
court of appeals held that the Maryland law regarding the enforce-
ment of charitable pledges and subscriptions to charitable organiza-
tions was the same as that expressed in section 90 of the Restatement 
(First)Y9 
112. 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979); see, e.g., Am. Univ. v. Collins, 190 Md. 
688, 59 A.2d 333 (1948); Sterling v. Cushwa & Sons, 170 Md. 226, 183 A. 
593 (1936); Erdman v. Trustees Eutaw Methodist Protestant Church, 129 
Md. 595, 99 A. 793 (1917). For a historical development of this doctrine 
through these cases, see Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 281-84,407 A.2d at 
1134-36. 
113. 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979). 
114. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
115. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 289,407 A.2d at 1138. 
116. Id. at 275, 407 A.2d at 1131. At the time of the decedent's death, $133,500 
remained unpaid on his initial pledge. Id. at 276, 407 A.2d at 1131. 
117. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
118. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 289, 407 A.2d at 1138. The outcome un-
doubtedly would have been different under section 90 of the Restatement 
(Second), which eliminated the requirement that the reliance be of a "defi-
nite and substantial" character. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
The court noted that the UJA made allocations to various beneficiary orga-
nizations based upon pledges it received, but did not incur liabilities based 
on those allocations. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 277,290,407 A.2d at 
1132, 1138. The decedent's failure to fully pay his pledge did not thwart 
any allocation by UJA, and they did not change their position in reliance on 
the subscription. Id. at 289, 407 A.2d at 1138. Therefore, the court stated, 
"it [did] not appear that injustice [could] be avoided only by enforcement 
of the promise." Id. at 290, 407 A.2d at 1138. 
119. See id. at 281, 407 A.2d at 1134 (discussing Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113 
(1854»; see also supra note 77 for the text of the Restatement (First). 
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Notwithstanding this early adoption of promissory estoppel for ap-
plication in disputes over charitable pledges,120 there remained an ini-
tial degree of uncertainty in Maryland as to its specific requirements 
and its utility in other areas. 121 One case that demonstrates this con-
fusion is Kiley v. First National Bank oj Maryland. 122 There, in a suit 
against a bank for closing a depositors' account, the court held that 
the depositors had failed to show, under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel, sufficient detrimental reliance on the bank's alleged 
promises not to vary the terms of the account or close it.123 In deny-
ing the plaintiffs' remedy, the court stated that it was unclear whether 
Maryland continued to follow the "more stringent formulation of 
promissory estoppel, as set forth in the original Restatement of Con-
tracts, or now follows the more flexible view found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts."124 Therefore, the court analyzed the case 
under both the Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second).125 
Maryland courts continued to be confused over this doctrine as evi-
denced by the decision of the court of special appeals in Snyder v. 
Snyder. 126 By erroneously imposing the additional requirement of 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the promisor,127 the Snyder court 
refused to apply promissory estoppel to enforce an oral contract trans-
120. See supra note lO8-lO. 
121. See, e.g., Chesapeake Supply & Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 232 
Md. 555, 566, 194 A2d 624, 630 (1963) (merely acknowledging the exis-
tence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but not mentioning the doc-
trine's standards); Kiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, lO2 Md. App. 317, 
649 A2d 1145 (1994); Snyder v. Snyder, 79 Md. App. 448, 558 A2d 417 
(1989). 
122. 102 Md. App. 317, 649 A2d 1145 (1994). 
123. Id. at 337, 649 A2d at 1154. The plaintiffs sought compensation and puni-
tive damages for the bank's alleged breach of contract and tortious conduct 
by imposing service charges on their account, altering the terms of their 
account, and subsequently closing their account. Id. at 321, 649 A.2d at 
1146. 
124. Id. at 337, 649 A2d at 1154; see supra Part IILA3. 
125. Kiley, 102 Md. App. at 336, 649 A.2d at 1154. The Kiley court noted that 
whether Maryland followed the Restatement (First) or Restatement (Second) did 
not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 336, 649 A2d at 1154. 
126. 79 Md. App. 448, 558 A.2d 412, cert. denied, 317 Md. 511, 564 A.2d 1182 
(1989). Contra Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 674 
A2d 521 (1995). 
127. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 458, 558 A2d at 417. This additional requirement 
demonstrates a potential confusion between promissory estoppel and the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. See supra notes 64-68. 
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ferring property between a wife and a husband. 128 In Snyder, pursuant 
to an oral agreement, the husband refused to re-title a home that he 
purchased with his wife before they married.129 One of the arguments 
advanced by the wife, to overcome the Statute of Frauds, was that the 
husband was estopped from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense. 130 
The court stated that" [0] ne of the most significant factors in deter-
mining whether justice demands enforcement of a promise is whether 
the promisor acted unconscionably."131 Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Restatement (First), as quoted by the court, did not require a show-
ing of fraud, the court held that to invoke promissory estoppel, the 
promisor must have no intention of fulfilling the promise at the time 
it was made. 132 
The court affirmed its misapplication of promissory estoppel in 
Friedman & Fuller, P. C. v. Funkhouser. 133 There, the plaintiff, defen-
dant's former employer, sued the defendant for breach of an employ-
ment contract. 134 In an attempt to overcome the Statute of Frauds 
defense, the employer invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel.135 
The court of special appeals held, however, that for promissory estop-
pel to prevail, not only must all the elements be met, but also, follow-
ing the precedent of Snyder, evidence must demonstrate that the 
promise was fraudulently made. 136 Therefore, because it was not clear 
the employer had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the employee's actions were fraudulent, the court reversed the 
128. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 458, 461, 558 A.2d at 417, 419. Here, the plaintiff 
attempted to use promissory estoppel as a means for overcoming the Stat-
ute of Frauds violation that occurred with an oral promise to transfer prop-
erty. Id. at 451, 558 A.2d at 414. 
129. Id. at 451, 558 A.2d at 413. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 458, 558 A.2d at 417. 
132. Id. 
133. 107 Md. App. 91, 666 A.2d 1298 (1995). 
134. Friedman & Fuller, 107 Md. App. at 91, 666 A.2d at 1299. The employee 
failed to satisfy the promise to modify the employment agreement to in-
clude a provision on trade secrets and a non-competition clause. Id. at 97-
98, 666 A.2d at 1301-02. 
135. Id. at Ill, 666 A.2d at 1308. 
136. Id. In order for promissory estoppel to prevail, the court stated that the 
following five elements must be met: "[1] the promise was fraudulently 
made, [2] the promisor anticipated that the promisee would rely on the 
oral promise, [3] the reliance was reasonable, [4] the promisee engaged in 
acts unequivocally referable to the oral promise, and [5] the promisee suf-
fered substantial injury as a result of [the] reliance." Id. (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
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trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant.137 
These two cases illustrate the inconsistency and confusion of Mary-
land appellate courts as to the requirements of promissory 
estoppel. 138 
B. Courts' Application of Promissory Estoppel to the Construction Industry 
Bidding Process 
Maryland courts may alleviate the unique problems associated with 
the construction bidding process by using the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel.139 Problems occur when no traditional contract has been 
formed, usually for lack of an acceptance, but when all parties rely on 
one another and one party suffers a loss because of an unmet expecta-
tion.140 Promissory estoppel is a legal fiction created to remedy situa-
tions where no formal contract exists,141 and acts to fill the void and 
protect the parties from the potential risk of financial 10ss.142 
1. Original Refusal to Apply Promissory Estoppel 
The first major case addressing the application of promissory estop-
pel to the relationship between general contractors and subcontrac-
tors is James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. 143 There, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the general contractor's con-
tention that the subcontractor should be held to his bid under the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel.144 Instead, applying traditional con-
tract law, the court held that no contract existed, because the subcon-
tractor's initial offer was withdrawn before acceptance occurred. 145 
137. [d. at 112, 666 A2d at 1309. 
138. Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 166, 168-69,674 A2d 
521,532534 (1995) (attempting to address this confusion and refusing to 
include an element of fraudulent conduct in the court's adoption of the 
Restatement (Second)). 
139. See id. For alternative remedies to these problems see Part IV. 
140. SWEET, supra note 2, at 388. 
141. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
142. See infra Part III.B.2-3. 
143. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). 
144. [d. at 346. 
145. [d. at 345. The court noted that it was possible for the parties to make a 
contract with the understanding that the contractor would accept the sub-
contractor's bid by submitting the contractor's bid for the entire project. 
[d. at 346. Here, however, the bid was not accepted upon use of the quote 
by the general contractor, as it contained the phrase'" [i]f successful in 
being awarded this contract, [they] will be absolutely guaranteed, ... and 
... we are offering these prices for reasonable' (sic), 'prompt acceptance 
after the general contract has been awarded.'" [d. at 345. 
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In Baird, the plaintiff, a general contractor bidding on the construc-
tion of a government building, relied on the defendant-subcontrac-
tor's bid of December 24, 1932, to supply linoleum at a specified 
price. 146 After realizing its employee underestimated the total 
amount of linoleum needed for the project by about one-half the cor-
rect amount, the defendant-subcontractor withdrew its bid on Decem-
ber 28, 1932.147 This withdrawal reached the plaintiff only after it 
submitted its main bid based in part on the linoleum price quoted by 
the defendant. 148 Two days after receiving the general contractor's 
bid, the soliciting party awarded the job to the plaintiff. 149 When the 
defendant refused to perform, the plaintiff filed suit. 150 
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, reasoned that because 
the submission of a bid by the subcontractor was only an offer to con-
tract, a subcontractor could withdraw the offer at any time before the 
general contractor's acceptance. 151 The court refused to apply the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, stating that it had no application in a 
commercial context where "an offer for an exchange is not meant to 
become a promise until a consideration has been received."152 Prom-
issory estoppel was only applicable to donative promises where the 
promisor did not expect an equivalent promise in return. 153 Where 
the subcontractor offered to deliver linoleum only in exchange for 
146. Id. The defendant sent an offer to supply all the linoleum required to 
twenty or thirty general contractors it thought would be bidding on the 
main project. Id. 
147. Id. The defendant withdrew its bid by telegraphing all the general contrac-
tors to whom it had sent estimates stating that the quoted price was a mis-
take and that the actual price would be much higher. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. Before this acceptance the defendant also wrote a letter confirming its 
withdrawal. Id. 
150. James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 345. The plaintiff sued under breach of contract 
since the defendant declined to recognize the existence of a contract. Id. 
151. Id. at 346. 
152. Id. The court wrote that promissory estoppel was primarily used to enforce 
charitable pledges and did not apply in the case at bar. Id. At the time of 
this decision, most jurisdictions followed the notion that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel only applied to charitable pledges where no considera-
tion was present. See CAi.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-1; see also. supra 
note 106 and accompanying text. 
153. James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346. Offers are ordinarily made in exchange for 
some sort of consideration; however, a person may make a promise without 
expecting one in return. Id. The court reasoned that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel only applied in such donative situations where the 
promisee relied on the promise. Id. 
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the general contractor's acceptance and payment for it,154 there was 
no room for promissory estoppel.155 The court reasoned that for it to 
hold otherwise "would be to hold the offeror [to the contract] regard-
less of the stipulated condition of his offer."156 Thus, the Baird court 
barred the use of promissory estoppel as a method to hold the subcon-
tractor to a bid.157 
Unless the general contractor formally accepted the subcontractor's 
bid, this decision left both parties unprotected in the bidding pro-
cess.158 By allowing the subcontractor to withdraw from a bid even 
after the general contractor relied upon the quote to formulate its 
own bid, general contractors risk being bound to an agreement based 
on the price of a subcontractor who refuses to perform. 159 Under 
Baird, the subcontractor is also exposed to significant risk because the 
general contractor, after the award of the contract, is free to negotiate 
154. Id.; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
155. James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. The court also refused to regard the offer as an option allowing the 
general contractor the right to accept the sub-bid if it was awarded the 
main bid. Id. Nevertheless, the court conceded that, if an option were 
found, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might apply. Id. 
158. Id. The general contractor could protect itself before the award of the sub-
contract, however, by use of a bond or option contract. Franklin M. Sch-
ultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction 
Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 262-63 (1952). 
159. Schultz, supra note 158, at 239 ("If the subcontractor revokes his bid before 
it is accepted by the general [contractor], any loss which results is a deduc-
tion from the general[] [contractor's] profit and conceivably may trans-
form overnight a profitable contract into a losing deal."); see also F.B. 
Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ark. 1964) (criti-
cizing the Baird rule and stating that the party who commits the mistake 
should bear any resulting loss). 
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for lower bids from other subcontractors. 160 Although this opinion 
was widely criticized,161 it remained influential. 162 
2. The First Use of Promissory Estoppel to Protect Parties in the Bid-
ding Process 
Partly in response to the cntlclsm of Baird,163 the California Su-
preme Court addressed the potential unfairness of that decision in 
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 164 In Drennan, the court held that, where a 
paving subcontractor submitted a bid to the general contractor, the 
general contractor's reliance on the subcontractor's bid made it 
irrevocable. 165 
The plaintiff, a general contractor, received a bid by phone from 
the defendant, a subcontractor, to perform the paving work on a pro-
ject.166 Relying on the defendant's quote in computing its own bid, 
the plaintiff submitted the main bid and was eventually awarded the 
160. For a discussion of bid shopping and bid peddling, see supra Part II.B. See 
also Closen & Weiland, supra note 29, at 583 (noting that under Baird, while 
bound by his offer to the soliciting party, the general contractor is not 
bound to any specific subcontractor and may, after being awarded the con-
tract, bid shop among other subcontractors before awarding the subcon-
tract). Nonetheless, it could be argued that although entailing risk, this 
creates a necessary balance between general contractors and subcontractors 
because, under Baird, neither party is bound by the initial offer. Kenneth L. 
Schriber, Note, Construction Contracts-The Problem of Offer and Acceptance in 
the General Contractor-Subcontractor Relationship, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 798,812-13 
(1968) . 
161. See, e.g., James G. Martin, N, Note, Contracts-Promissory Estoppel, 20 VA. L. 
REv. 214 (1933); Schultz, supra note 158, at 242-43. 
162. See Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 418 P.2d 187, 189 (N.M. 1966) 
(holding that a builder's reliance upon an offer in preparing his prime 
construction bid did not amount to an acceptance or constitute promissory 
estoppel). 
163. See supra notes 161 and accompanying text. 
164. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
165. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60. Reliance on the bid made it irrevocable as 
long as the bid was silent with respect to the subcontractor's right to re-
voke, and the general contractor used the bid in making its own successful 
bid on the project. Id. 
166. Id. at 758. The plaintiff testified that it was customary in the trade for gen-
eral contractors to receive bids from subcontractors by telephone and sub-
sequently rely upon them in computing their bid for the contract. Id.; see 
also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
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contract. 167 Unlike in Baird, where the offer was revoked before the 
main bid was awarded,168 the defendant in Drennan informed the 
plaintiff that there was a mistake in the bid and that the quoted price 
was too low only after the general contract had been awarded. 169 This 
attempt to revoke occurred, however, before the general contractor's 
acceptance of the sub-bid. 170 As a result, the plaintiff was forced to 
use another subcontractor to complete the paving and ultimately paid 
the difference between the original bid and the substitute bid.171 
The court found that there was neither an option contract sup-
ported by consideration nor a binding bilateral contract.172 Nonethe-
less, the court, relying on section 90 of the Restatement (First), 173 stated 
that defendant's bid constituted a promise to perform.174 Although 
Judge Rodger Traynor, writing for the court, most likely agreed with 
Hand's argument that section 90 has no application in a bargained for 
exchange, the court found, through analogy to section 45 of the Re-
statement (First), 175 an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke the 
bid.176 The court stated that: 
167. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 758. The plaintiff relied on the defendant's sub-bid in 
computing its main bid because the defendant's bid for the paving portion 
of the project was the lowest bid submitted. Id. 
168. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
169. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 758-59. The general contractor was informed of the 
mistake in the bid when he stopped by the subcontractor's office after be-
ing awarded the project contract. Id. at 758. 
170. Id. at 758-59. It could be argued, however, that the general contractor was 
in the act of accepting the sub-bid when the defendant revoked the offer. 
171. Id. at 759. The difference between defendant's offer and the cost of using a 
substitute paving subcontractor was $3,817. Id. 
172. Id. The defendant contended, much like in Baird, that there was no en-
forceable contract on the ground that the defendant made a revocable of-
fer and withdrew it before the plaintiff accepted. Id. As in Baird, the 
Drennan court found that no option contract or bilateral contract existed. 
Id. There was "no evidence that defendant offered to make its bid irrevoca-
ble in exchange for plaintiff's use of its figures in computing his bid." Id. 
Nor was it shown that the plaintiff's use of the bid was an acceptance bind-
ing the plaintiff to award the defendant the subcontract, in the event the 
plaintiff received the main contract. Id. 
173. See supra note 77. 
174. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759. 
175. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACfS § 45 (1932). Section 45 states: "[iJfan 
offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration re-
quested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, 
the offeror is bound by a contract ... . n Id. 
176. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760. The court was able to overcome Baird by analo-
gizing this situation to a unilateral contract. Id. at 759. Under section 45 of 
the Restatement (First), if part of the consideration is given in response to a 
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When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own 
bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's 
terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its 
bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to 
whether it would be used or not. On the contrary, . . . 
[d]efendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely 
on its bid but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake 
in plaintiff's reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the 
fact that plaintiff is bound by his own bid, it is only fair that 
plaintiff should have at least an opportunity to accept defen-
dant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to 
him. 177 
The court overcame the absence of consideration by substituting 
for it reliance on an implied promise to keep the bid open for a rea-
sonable period of time.178 Promissory estoppel was used, not as a con-
sideration substitute for the formation of a contract or the invited 
acceptance, but as consideration for an implied promise not to revoke 
the bid.179 Judge Traynor ·was able to create this implied promise by 
melding together sections 90180 and 45181 of the Restatement (First).182 
Therefore, unlike in Baird, the court held the subcontractor to its bid 
by making the bid irrevocable.183 
By deliberately rejecting Baird and the reasoning of Judge Hand,184 
Drennan paved the way for applying promissory estoppel to construc-
unilateral contract, the offeror is bound to the contract. Id. at 759 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45). The court noted that under sec-
tion 45 comment b, the "main offer includes a subsidiary promise, necessa-
rily implied, that if part of the requested performance is given, the offeror 
will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted." Id. 
at 760 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b). There-
fore, whether implied in law or fact, the subsidiary promise precludes the 
injustice which would result if the offeror could withdraw the offer even 
after the offeree had detrimentally relied upon it. Id. 
177. Id. The court noted, however, that the general contractor is not free to bid 
shop once the general contract has been awarded, nor can the general con-
tractor attempt to bargain with the subcontractor for a better deal while at 
the same time claim a continuing right to accept the original offer of the 
subcontractor. Id. 
178. Id. This principle is now expressed in section 87(2) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond). See supra note 90. 
179. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760. The bid was found to be irrevocable even though 
the offer was silent as to revocation. Id. at 759-60. 
180. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 175. 
182. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60. 
183. Id. at 757. 
184. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text. 
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tion transactions.185 This new application afforded the general con-
tractor protection from a subcontractor who attempted to revoke a 
sub-bid after the general contractor had already justifiably relied on it 
in computing and submitting the main bid.186 Although the court did 
note that a general contractor is not permitted to delay acceptance or 
reopen bargaining with the subcontractor in order to obtain a better 
price,187 the court's holding placed the general contractor in a 
stronger position than subcontractors.188 
3. Other Jurisdictions' Use of Promissory Estoppel in Construction 
Bidding Disputes 
All jurisdictions in the United States have adopted and currently 
apply some form of promissory estoppel, usually grounded in section 
90 of the Restatement.189 The Drennan decision was widely followed by 
other jurisdictions. 190 The exact form of this reliance theory, how-
185. See Murphy, supra note 58, at 393. 
186. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60. 
187. Id. at 760. The court noted, in what arguably could be dictum, that a gen-
eral contractor cannot delay acceptance once the contract has been 
awarded in order to get a better price, nor can the general contractor reo-
pen bargaining with a subcontractor after accepting the original offer. Id.; 
see also supra Part I1.B. 
188. See Katz, supra note 96, at 1277 (stating that general contractors are over-
protected under the Drennan decision). 
189. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAME'ITE L. 
REv. 263, 265 (1996). Although some critics say promissory estoppel is wan-
ing, many jurisdictions have adopted it. Id. In fact both Georgia and Loui-
siana have gone even further and adopted promissory estoppel by statute. 
See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-44 (1982); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (West 
1987). 
190. See Preload Tech., Inc. v. A.B. &]. Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 
1983); C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 
1977); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 
1963); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. 
Wis. 1974); Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 
576 (Alaska 1984); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'r Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 
799 (Cal. 1971); Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 319 (Cal. 1969); Norcross v. Winters, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. 1962); 
C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Graffe & Assoc., Inc. 414 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1966); Pavel 
Enters., Inc. v. A.S.Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143,674 A.2d 521 (1996); Loran-
ger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1978); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 190 
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1971); LAHR Constr. Corp. v.]. Kozel & Son, Inc., 640 
N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Sup. 1996); Arango Constr. Co. v. Success Roofing, Inc., 
730 P.2d 720 (Wash. App. Div. 1986). 
194 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
ever, varies from state to state.191 In searching for the correct stan-
dard to apply in Maryland, it is helpful to examine how other 
jurisdictions have applied sections 90 and 87(2) 192 of the Restatement 
(Second) in construction industry bidding disputes. 
a. The Majority's Use of Promissory Estoppel: Adopting Drennan Instead of 
Baird 
In a large number of states, promissory estoppel is used as a substi-
tute for consideration in order to make a sub-bid irrevocable. 19g For 
example, in Alaska Bussell Electric Co. v. Vern Hickel Construction CO.,194 
the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Drennan rationale for apply-
ing promissory estoppel. 195 There, the plaintiff, a general contractor, 
sued the defendant, an electrical subcontractor, for revoking a sub-bid 
as the result of an error in computation for the building of a commis-
sary for the United States Air Force at Elmendorf. 196 Although the 
court recognized the risk to subcontractors of broadly applying prom-
issory estoppel/97 it wrote that "we believe Drennan is better case law 
than Baird."19s The court noted that, as applied in Drennan, promis-
sory estoppel has the effect of encouraging subcontractors to take 
191. See generally Holmes, supra note 189, at 297-514 (giving a comprehensive 
jurisdiction-by jurisdiction analysis of promissory estoppel). 
192. It is important to note, however, that no jurisdiction in reaching a decision 
on a construction industry bidding dispute has solely applied section 87 (2) 
of the Restatement (Second). See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
Rather, a majority of states apply the reasoning behind Drennan, while cit-
ing both sections 90 and 87 (2) of the Restatement (Second). See supra notes 
104-05. 
193. See, e.g., Air Conditioning Co. v. Richards Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 167, 
170-71 (D. Haw. 1961); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 
820 (Ark. 1964); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958); 
see also supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
194. 688 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1984). 
195. [d. at 579-80. Although the court adopted the Drennan rationale, the deci-
sion was different in that the jury did not award expectation damages. [d. 
at 581-82. The jury apparently only wanted to award damages for the actual 
harm incurred to the general contractor, that is, reliance damages. 
Holmes, supra note 189, at 307. 
196. Alaska Bussell Ekc. Co., 688 P.2d at 577-78. The defendant had informed the 
plaintiff as to the omission of the cost of site work after the plaintiff was 
informed it was the lowest bidder, but before the contract was officially 
awarded to the plaintiff. [d. at 577. 
197. [d. at 580. 
198. [d. The court described the Baird decision as the narrower view and the 
Drennan decision as setting forth a broader application of promissory estop-
pel to the construction bidding context. [d. at 579-80. 
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greater care when formulating their sub-bids, thereby avoiding er-
rors.199 This application of promissory estoppel, the court wrote, ben-
efits the needs of the modem construction industry bidding 
process.200 
Similarly, in the 1964 case of Reynolds v. Texarkana Construction 
CO.,201 the Arkansas Supreme Court applied section 90 where the gen-
eral contractor relied on the sub-bid in computing its main bid.202 
There the plaintiff, relying on a bid from the defendant for electrical 
work, was the successful bidder for a school construction project.203 
The defendant, however, refused to perform because of an error in 
computation.204 Applying section 90 of the Restatement as a substitute 
for a lack of consideration,205 the court found the sub-bid irrevoca-
ble.206 The court reasoned that "[j]ustice demands that the loss re-
sulting from the subcontractor's carelessness should fall upon him 
who was guilty of the error rather than upon the [general] contractor 
who relied in good faith upon the offer that he received."207 
Even the forum state of the Baird decision has since adopted prom-
issory estoppel when deciding construction bidding disputes.208 As a 
result of Baird, promissory estoppel had no application to commercial 
transactions in New York, such as construction industry bidding dis-
putes.209 Subsequent New York cases, however, repudiated this re-
striction.210 The New York Supreme Court, in James King & Sons v. 
DeSantis Construction,211 specifically rejected the Baird opinion and 
held a subcontractor liable in damages, under the doctrine of promis-
199. [d. at 580. 
200. [d. The court went on to label promissory estoppel, as adopted in Drennan, 
a necessary element in the scheme of construction industry bidding. [d. 
201. 374 S.W.2d 818 (Ark. 1964). 
202. [d. at 819-20. 
203. [d. at 819. 
204. [d. Specifically, the subcontractor overlooked the cost of the fixtures re-
quired for the project. [d. The defendant's refusal to perform compelled 
the plaintiff to hire another electrical subcontractor at an amount in excess 
of the defendant's bid. [d. 
205. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
206. Reynolds, 374 S.W.2d at 820. 
207. [d. 
208. SeeJames King & Son v. DeSantis Constr., 413 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1977). The elements of promissory estoppel in New York are: (1) a clear 
and unambiguous promise; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise 
was made; (3) reliance that is both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the 
party asserting promissory estoppel must be injured by the reliance. [d. 
209. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text analyzing the Baird opinion. 
210. See, e.g., James King & Son, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 81. 
211. 413 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
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sory estoppel, to a contractor who relied on the subcontractor's bid in 
formulating its main bid.212 Nonetheless, New York's highest court 
has yet to specifically adopt section 90 as an independent claim for 
relief.213 
b. The Minority's Strict Use of Promissory Estoppel to Extend Protection to All 
Parties 
In response to the criticism that Drennan left the subcontractor ex-
posed to risk,214 other jurisdictions have strictly construed promissory 
estoppel and refused to apply it if the general contractor demon-
strates a lack of reliance by bid shopping.215 For example, recogniz-
ing the equitable basis for the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Texas 
courts do not apply it to bidding disputes if the general contractor is 
found guilty of bid shopping after being awarded the main contract 
and before accepting a subcontract.216 In Sipco Services Marine, Inc. v. 
Wyatt Field Service CO.,217 the court reasoned that this practice is evi-
dence of a failure to rely and leaves the general contractor with "un-
clean hands."218 
This approach is also taken by Utah, which does not apply the doc-
trine if the general contractor bid shops for a better deal after being 
awarded the main contract or engages in bid chiseling with subcon-
tractors.219 This was advocated by Judge Traynor in dictum220 and is 
212. Id. at 8l. 
213. Holmes, supra note 189, at 266 n.2. 
214. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
215. See, e.g., Sipco Servs. Marine, Inc. v. Wyatt Field Servo Co., 857 S.W.2d 602, 
605-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the general contractor had not 
waived its claim of promissory estoppel against the subcontractor'by solicit-
ing bids from other subcontractors because changes in the project and 
lapse of time had occurred since the original sub-bid); RJ. Daum Constr. 
CO. V. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 823 (Utah 1952) (stating that where a general 
contractor, who created the main contract on the basis of a subcontractor's 
sub-bid, has submitted counteroffers to other subcontractors, the original 
subcontractor is not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from 
denying the main contract); see also supra Part II.B. 
216. See Sipco Seros. Marine, Inc., 857 S.W.2d at 605-06; see also supra Part II.B. 
217. 857 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
218. Id. at 606. 
219. See RJ Daum Constr. Co., 247 P.2d at 823 (explaining that the general con-
tractor's proposed written contract to the subcontractor was a counteroffer 
and not an acceptance of the subcontractor's bid). 
220. If the language of Drennan is strictly construed, then the general contractor 
would not be free to bid shop once the contract has been awarded since 
this would negate any alleged reliance. See supra note 177 and accompany-
ing text. 
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probably the best method to extend the protection of promissory es-
toppel to both the general contractor and to subcontractors as well.221 
c. Two States' Use of Promissory Estoppel Only as a Defensive Theory 
The highest courts of North Carolina and Virginia also have not 
expressly adopted promissory estoppel to grant relief.222 For exam-
ple, in North Carolina, as the result of a lower court's attempt to ar-
rest the development of promissory estoppel, a very different 
approach is taken than in most other states.223 The North Carolina 
Court of Appeals refused to extend promissory estoppel to bind a sub-
contractor to its bid based on the general contractor's reliance on that 
bid.224 The court stated: 
[0] ur courts have never recognized promissory estoppel as a 
substitute for consideration .... Cases which have applied 
the doctrine have done so in a defensive situation, where 
there has been an intended abandonment of an existing 
right by the promisee. North Carolina case law has not ap-
proved the doctrine for affirmative relief. 225 
This decision may discourage parties from pleading promissory es-
toppel;226 however, the doctrine does exist as a defensive theory227 
and whether it applies to construction cases will not be finalized until 
the North Carolina Supreme Court addresses the issue. 
C. Maryland's Attempt to Use Promissory Estoppel in the Construction Bid-
ding Context 
Maryland cases that address the use of promissory estoppel in con-
struction bidding disputes are sparse.228 Before 1996, Maryland 
courts had neither addressed the issue of when a subcontractor's offer 
221. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
222. Holmes, supra note 189, at 265 n.2. 
223. See Home Elec. Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air 
Conditioning Co., 358 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), affd per curiam 
without opinion, 366 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 1988) (noting that North Carolina 
courts do not recognize the doctrine of promissory estoppel in all 
situtations) . 
224. Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2d at 541. 
225. [d. 
226. See, e.g., Labarre v. Duke Univ., 393 S.E.2d 321, 324 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) 
(noting that the parties to the case did not attempt to argue that promis-
sory estoppel could be used as a substitute for consideration to enforce a 
doctor's gratuitous promise). 
227. Holmes, supra note 189, at 427. 
228. For a description of Maryland cases using promissory estoppel in other cir-
cumstances see supra Part III.A.4. 
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and a general contractor's acceptance form a binding contract,229 nor 
had they addressed the application of promissory estoppel to such a 
situation.230 Maryland law does permit a general contractor to accept 
a subcontractor's bid before the general contractor is awarded the 
main contract by the soliciting party.231 If, however, acceptance of the 
sub-bid has not occurred, parties need not honor their offers unless 
another method, such as promissory estoppel, is applied.232 
1. Pavel Enterprises 
In an apparent attempt to clarifY the exact status of promissory es-
toppel in Maryland,233 the court of appeals in Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. 
A.S. Johnson CO. 234 explicitly adopted the Restatement (Second) oj Con-
tracts for application in construction industry bidding disputes.235 M-
ter reviewing the construction bidding process,236 providing a 
historical overview of the cases dealing with its problems237 and ex-
plaining the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Maryland,23B the court 
held the evidence insufficient to establish the general contractor's 
detrimental reliance on the sub-bid.239 
229. See, e.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 152,674 A2d 
521,526 (1995). 
230. [d. at 163, 674 A2d at 531 (recognizing that nothing in previous cases sug-
gests that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was intended to be limited to 
specific instances). 
231. See, e.g., Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 540-41, 369 
A2d lO17, lO24-25 (1977). There, the court of appeals found a valid ac-
ceptance by the general contractor of the subcontractor's offer even 
though the main contract had not been awarded to the general contractor. 
[d. The court also noted that the question of whether an offer is of a type 
that can be converted into a contract of sale upon its acceptance is depen-
dent upon the intention of the parties and therefore depends on the facts 
and circumstances of a particular case. [d. at 540, 369 A2d at 1024. 
232. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra Part III.A4. 
234. 342 Md. 143,674 A2d 521 (1996). 
235. [d. at 166, 674 A2d at 532. 
236. [d. at 152, 674 A2d at 525-26. 
237. [d. at 152-58, 674 A.2d at 526-29. 
238. [d. at 164-67, 674 A.2d at 531-33. 
239. /d. at 168-69, 674 A2d at 534. The court also affirmed the trial court's 
holding that recovery by the general contractor was not justified under 
traditional bilateral contract theory. [d. at 162, 674 A2d at 531. The trial 
court had rejected PEl's claim of a bilateral contract because there was no 
meeting of the minds, and the offer was withdrawn before acceptance oc-
curred. [d. 
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The facts of Pavel Enterprises are typical of most construction bidding 
disputes resulting from subcontractor error.240 In Pavel Enterprises, the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) solicited bids for a renovation pro-
ject241 and Pavel Enterprises, Inc. (PEl), a general contractor, relying 
on solicited sub-bids from various subcontractors, placed a main bid 
for the project.242 One of the subcontractors on which PEl relied was 
A.S. Johnson Co. ('Johnson"), a mechanical subcontractor, who sub-
mitted a written scope proposal for the heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning portion of the project, but had omitted the price.243 As 
is the practice in the construction industry, Johnson waited until the 
last day before PEl submitted its main bid to call and verbally submit a 
price.244 
When the general contractors' bids were opened on August 5, 1993, 
PEl's bid was the second lowest.245 Mter disqualifying the lowest bid-
der, the government notified PEl in mid-August that its bid would be 
accepted.246 On August 26, 1993, Thomas Pavel, president of PEl, 
met with James Kirk,Johnson's chief estimator, to become acquainted 
with the company's operations.247 Mter the meeting, PEl sent a fax to 
all mechanical subcontractors informing them that PEl would be 
awarded the contract from NIH.248 
On September 1, 1993, PEl mailed and faxed a letter to Johnson 
formally accepting the sub-bid.249 Upon receipt of the fax, Johnson 
called PEl to inform them that the bid contained an error and, as a 
240. See supra notes 14&-50, 16&-71 and accompanying text. 
241. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 146, 674 A.2d at 523. The proposed work 
entailed demolition and mechanical work, including heating, ventilation, 
and air conditioning. Id. at 146-47, 674 A.2d at 523. 
242. Id. PEl solicited bids from a number of mechanical subcontractors, one of 
which was the defendant. Id. 
243. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523. 
244. Id. It is common practice in the construction industry for the subcontrac-
tor's bid amount to be entered immediately before the general contractor 
submits the main bid to the owner. Id.; see also id. at 147 n.2, 674 A.2d at 
523 n.2. Johnson's verbal quote was $898,000 for the heating, ventilation, 
and air conditioning portion, which PEl then used in computing its own 
bid of $1,585,000 for the entire project. Id.; see also supra note 39 and ac-
companying text. This custom protects the subcontractor from a general 
contractor who intends to shop for a lower sub-bid. See supra Part II.B. 
245. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523. 
246. Id. This was a few weeks after the date when the general contractors' bids 
were originally opened. Id. 
247. Id. at 147-48, 674 A.2d at 524. 
248. Id. at 148, 674 A.2d at 524. 
249. Id. at 149, 674 A.2d at 524. This fax was sent after PEl had informed NIH 
that Johnson was to be the mechanical subcontractor on the project. Id. 
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result, the quoted price was too low.250 According to the estimating 
manager at Johnson who testified at trial, the mistake had been dis-
covered earlier, but because they believed that PEl had not been 
awarded the contract, they felt no duty to correct the error.251 John-
son attempted to immediately withdraw its bid, but PEl refused.252 
On September 28, 1993, NIH formally awarded the construction con-
tract to PEl, requiring them to find a substitute subcontractor to com-
plete the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning work, resulting in 
financial loss.253 
The trial court held that there was no bilateral contract between 
PEl and Johnson because PEl failed to make a timely and valid accept-
ance of Johnson's offer.254 The trial court also rejected PEl's claim of 
promissory estoppel. 255 PEl appealed this decision under traditional 
contract theory of offer and acceptance and the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel.256 
In response to PEl's promissory estoppel claim, the court of appeals 
applied Restatement (Second) section 90(1).257 Instead of adhering to 
the text of the Restatement, however, the court transformed section 90 
into a four-part test.258 This reformulated test required: 
(1) a clear and definite promise; (2) where the promisor has 
a reasonable expectation that the offer will induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee; (3) which does in-
duce actual and reasonable action or forbearance by the 
250. Id. at 150, 674 A.2d at 524. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 150-51, 674 A.2d at 524-25. 
253. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. PEl subsequently 
brought suit against Johnson to recover $32,000, the difference between 
the original sub-bid and the cost of the substitute subcontractor. Id. 
254. Id. at 161,674 A.2d at 530. The theory endorsed by the trial court was that 
Johnson's sub-bid was an offer of a contingent contract which PEl accepted 
on September 1 "subject to the condition precedent" of NIH awarding the 
contract to PEl. Id. at 163, 674 A.2d at 531. Therefore, prior to the occur-
rence of the condition precedent Johnson was free to withdraw. Id. 
255. Id. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531. This doctrine was applicable if PEl had detri-
mentally relied on the sub-bid. Id. 
256. Id. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. Although PEl initially appealed the decision of 
the court of special appeals, the court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari 
before the lower appellate court could consider the case. Id. 
257. Id. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. The court stated that by adopting the Restate-
ment (Second), it was ridding Maryland jurisprudence of the confusion sur-
rounding the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id.; see also supra notes 121-
38 and accompanying text. 
258. Id. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. 
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promisee; and (4) causes a detriment which can only be 
avoided by the enforcement of the promise.259 
201 
Recognizing the existing confusion over the application of promis-
sory estoppel, the court stated that to the extent past opinions re-
quired a showing of fraud on the part of the offeror, they were 
disapproved.260 
Applying this new test to the facts of the case, the court agreed with 
the trial court that the sub-bid was sufficiently clear and definite to 
constitute an offer in satisfying the first element.261 Under the second 
element, however, the court found no error in the trial court's hold-
ing that due to the lapse of time between the opening of bidding and 
the actual awarding of the contract, it was "unreasonable for the offer 
to continue."262 In doing so, the court effectively added the extra re-
quirement that the subcontractor's expectation that the general con-
tractor rely on the sub-bid not dissipate over time.263 Despite the trial 
court's lack of findings of fact as to the third and fourth elements, the 
court assumed and inferred that PEl did not rely on Johnson's bid264 
259. Id. The court stated that this formulation comported with that in Union 
Trust Co. of Maryland v. Charter Med. Cory., 663 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md. 
1986), where the United States District Court of Maryland held that a cor-
poration, with whom the debtor was purportedly going to merge, could not 
be held liable to the creditor under the theory of promissory estoppel 
based on representations made at a meeting. Id. at 166 n.29, 674 A.2d at 
533 n.29. See also supra note 84 and accompanying text for a description of 
the Restatement's version of promissory estoppel. 
260. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 166, n.29, 674 A.2d at 532-33, n.29; see also 
supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. 
261. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533. The court noted that 
determining whether a bid constitutes an offer is such a fact-specific judg-
ment that it is best achieved by a case-by-case analysis. Id. In this case the 
trial judge had found the bid to be an offer, and the court declined to hold 
this finding to be clearly erroneous. Id. 
262. Id. The court noted that "course of dealing" and "usage of trade" would 
provide evidence of whether a subcontractor's expectations were reasona-
ble. Id. at 167, n.30, 674 A.2d at 533, n.30. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533. In analyzing whether a party relied on a bid 
under the third element, the court noted that: (1) the fact that a general 
contractor engaged in bid shopping or encouraged bid peddling is evi-
dence that the general contractor did not rely on the sub-bid; (2) prompt 
notice by the general contractor to the subcontractor of an intent to use 
the bid on a project is evidence that the general contractor relied on the 
bid; and (3) the fact that a sub-bid is so low that a reasonably prudent gen-
eral contractor would not rely upon it is evidence that the general contrac-
tor did not rely on the sub-bid. Id. The court assumed that the third 
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and, therefore, the case did not merit an equitable remedy. 265 Al~ 
though the court adopted section 90 for use in construction cases, 
because of the added requirement that the reliance not have a chance 
to dissipate over time,266 PEl was not afforded a remedy for the su~ 
contractor's error.267 
2. The Effects of Pavel Enterprises: Continued Confusion Surrounding 
Promissory Estoppel in Construction Bidding Disputes 
By incorrectly applying promissory estoppel as outlined in the Re~ 
statement (Second),268 this opinion by the court of appeals arguably re-
turned Maryland to the law under Baird, where neither party was 
protected.269 Even though the court explicitly stated it was adopting 
the Restatement for application in Maryland construction cases,270 its 
failure to adhere to the Restatement diminishes the impact of its pur-
ported application and continues to add to the confusion surround-
ing promissory estoppel in Maryland.271 
First, the court deviated from the Restatement's explicit request that 
section 87(2), rather than section 90, apply to construction bidding 
disputes.272 Section 87(2) was expressly intended to deal with these 
types of disputes as a result of the controversy created by the Drennan 
decision.273 Nonetheless, the court ignored section 87(2) and fo-
cused solely on its reformulation of section 90 of the Restatement.274 
element was not met based on the trial judge's statement that" 'the parties 
did not have a definite, certain meeting of the minds on a certain price for 
a certain quantity of goods and wanted to renegotiate ... '" as evidenced by 
PEl's August 26, 1993 fax to all mechanical subcontractors. Id. The court 
further stated that although not clearly erroneous, the trial court's assumed 
finding as to the third element was "indisputably a close call." Id. 
265. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 53~34. For the fourth ele-
ment, to be demonstrated, the court stated a general contractor must have 
'''clean hands.'" Id. In the instant case, because the trial court was silent, 
the court inferred the absence of intent to permit an equitable remedy. Id. 
266. Id. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533 (basing the decision on a failure of PEl to satisfy 
the second element). 
267. Id. at 167-69, 674 A.2d at 53~34. 
268. For a detailed analysis of Pavel Enters., Inc. and extensive criticism of that 
opinion, see Scherr, supra note 107. See also supra note 84 for the elements 
of promissory estoppel under the Restatement (Second). 
269. See supra notes 159~0 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra note 235. 
271. See supra notes 121~38 and accompanying text. 
272. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
274. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. 
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Second, the court inaccurately analyzed the holding of Drennan, 
and thus failed to eliminate remaining uncertainty regarding the doc-
trine in Maryland.275 The court expressly recognized that in Drennan, 
promissory estoppel was not applied in its traditional function as a 
consideration substitute for the entire contract; rather, it was used as 
consideration for the subcontractor's implied subsidiary promise to 
keep the bid open for a reasonable period of time.276 This recogni-
tion is blurred by the court's subsequent statement that recovery in 
Drennan was based on "traditional bilateral contract [theory], with the 
sub-bid as the offer and promissory estoppel serving to replace accept-
ance."277 These two assertions are inconsistent. The interpretation 
that promissory estoppel replaces acceptance is incongruous with the 
rationale of Drennan.278 
IT the court of appeals was truly adopting Restatement (Second) section 
90, it would have followed the application of section 90 in Drennan. 279 
Accordingly, by submitting a bid, a subcontractor is deemed to have 
reasonably expected the promise to induce action or forbearance, and 
by using the sub-bid in the overall bid, the general contractor is 
deemed to have relied.280 This application of section 90, as enunci-
ated in Drennan, would have resulted in a different outcome in Pavel 
Enterprises. 
Unlike in Drennan, where the sub-bid was accepted after the attempt 
to revoke,281 the sub-bid in Pavel Enterprises was accepted before the 
attempted revocation by the subcontractor.282 Arguably, in such a sce-
nario there is no need for promissory estoppel to hold the subcontrac-
tor's offer open.283 Therefore, the facts in this case were not ideal for 
the application of promissory estoppel. 284 
Finally, the court's reformulation of section 90 added to the confu-
sion of promissory estoppel jurisprudence in Maryland. Elements 
three and four are facially consistent with the requirements and lan-
guage of section 90, but the court imposed additional factors under 
275. See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text. 
276. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 155, 674 A.2d at 527. 
277. Id. at 155, 674 A.2d at 527. 
278. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text. 
280. Reliance by the general contractor was present, as the trial court found that 
"PEl relied upon Johnson'S sub-bid" in computing its bid for the entire 
project. See Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. 
281. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
284. See Pavel Enters. Inc., 342 Md. at 164-67, 674 A.2d at 532-33. 
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the first and second elements.285 Section 90 requires that the prom-
isor reasonably expect his promise to induce action or forbearance 
and that the promise does induce such action or forbearance.286 It 
does not, as the court added, require an expectation of continued 
reliance by the promisee.287 Although the general contractor may not 
rely upon the promise if bid shopping occurs,288 a requirement of 
continued reliance by the general contractor is unnecessary289 and 
runs contrary to the case law of other jurisdictions.29o This additional 
requirement makes promissory estoppel under certain circumstances 
inapplicable as a protection against the risks encountered by subcon-
tractors and general contractors.291 
The court's reformulation of section 90 also added an additional 
requirement to element one, that the promise be of a "clear and defi-
nite" nature,292 something that does not exist in the Restatement 
(Firstf93 or Restatement (Second).294 Accordingly, Maryland's applica-
tion of section 90 is conditioned on a threshold finding of a "clear and 
definite promise."295 This requirement diverges from the Restatement 
(Second) definition of a promise, which only requires a manifestation 
of intent to act or refrain from acting.296 Requiring a "clear and defi-
nite promise" limits the applicability of promissory estoppel. 297 One 
commentator noted that where the requisite promise is elevated to an 
offer status, promissory estoppel is held inapplicable in most court 
285. See supra notes 259, 262-63 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra notes 177, 219-20 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B. 
289. See supra note 84. 
290. Most other jurisdictions only require that the promisor reasonably expect 
reliance and that the promisee's reliance is satisfied merely by the general 
contractor's use of the subcontractor's bid. See supra Part II.B.3.a. for a 
discussion of cases which follow Drennan. 
291. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. Therefore, in certain situations, 
application of this doctrine in Maryland will lead to the same result as 
would a decision following Baird. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying 
text. 
292. Pavel Enters. Inc., 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. 
293. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
295. If the first element is not satisfied there is no cause for the court to apply 
the remaining elements of promissory estoppel. See supra note 259. 
296. Holmes, supra note 189, at 286 (arguing that court's use of the heightened 
standard of a "clear and definite promise" ignores the definiton of a prom-
ise in section 2 of the Restatement (Second). 
297. Id. 
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opinions.298 Similarly, the two Maryland decisions after Pavel Enter-
prises that applied the reformulation never reached elements two, 
three, and four, instead basing their decisions to reject promissory es-
toppel on a failure to find a "clear and definite promise."299 
IV. ALTERNATIVES 
In the event the Court of Appeals of Maryland does not clarify the 
application of promissory estoppel in construction bidding disputes, 
there are three alternatives available to protect contractors.300 These 
alternatives, which also bind parties to their bids, arguably create just 
as stable a construction industry bidding process as the correct appli-
cation of promissory estoppe1.301 These alternatives are the firm offer 
provision,302 bid depositories,303 and the state bidding statutes.304 Al-
though these are viable alternatives, each has certain limitations.305 
Again, the best solution to Maryland's dilemma would be for the court 
of appeals to clarify its holding in Pavel Enterprises.306 
A. Firm Offer 
One common suggestion is the application by analogy of the firm 
offer provision as outlined in section 2-205 of the Uniform Commer-
298. Id. 
299. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 122 Md. App. 295, 712 A,2d 132 (1998); Dunnaville v. 
McCormick & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 527 (D. Md. 1998). In Doe, the court of 
special appeals held, inter alia, that Mrs. Doe's promise to Mr. Doe that he 
could rely on her stock holdings for retirement if he deposited his income 
into a joint checking account was insufficient for a claim of promissory es-
toppel because the complaint "did not allege what [the defendant] meant 
when she allegedly told [the plaintiff] he could 'rely' on her stockholdings 
for his retirement .... " Doe, 122 Md. App. at 360, 712 A,2d at 164. Thus, 
the court refused to enforce the promise because there was no "clear and 
definite promise." Id. Also, in Dunnaville, the Federal District Court for the 
District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, held that a prospective buyer 
of a corporation's subsidiary could not maintain a claim against the corpo-
ration under the theory of promissory estoppel because the plaintiff could 
not show that the defendant made "a clear and definite promise." Dun-
naville, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 534. 
300. See infra Part N.A-C. 
301. See generally Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the V. e. e., and the 
Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 659 (1988). 
302. See infra Part N.A. 
303. See infra Part N.B. 
304. See infra Part N.C. 
305. See infra notes 310-12, 321, 333-34 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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cial Code (V.C.C.).307 This section makes a subcontractor's bid irrev-
ocable if the offer is in a signed writing, which by its terms gives 
assurance that it will be held open for a reasonable period of time.308 
The authors of this section believed that these two additional require-
ments to the traditional theory of promissory estoppel would elimi-
nate some of the dangers the conventional doctrine imposed.309 
However, because the V.C.C. applies only to transactions in goods,310 
section 2-205 cannot be applied to most construction bidding dis-
putes, which essentially involve contracts for services.311 Therefore, 
only a few courts have considered the relevance of this section before 
proceeding to apply promissory estoppe1.312 
B. Bid Depositories 
One alternative that has been developed by the construction indus-
try is bid depositories.313 A bid depository is an organization created 
by subcontractors and used by owners, contractors, and suppliers.314 
It is designed to facilitate the bidding process according to specified 
307. V.C.C. § 2-205 (1999); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-205 (1997) 
(following the V.C.C. verbatim). 
308. V.C.C. § 2-205; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-205; Pavel Enters., 
Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 159-60, 647 A.2d 521, 529 (1995) 
(recognizing the use of V.C.C. § 2-205 as an alternative to promissory 
estoppel). 
309. Gibson, supra note 301, at 703. The main reason for the requirement of a 
writing was to eliminate the danger that an unscrupulous contractor would 
falsely testify to receiving a sub-bid and subsequently claim to have relied 
on that sub-bid. Id. The main reason for the requirement that the offer be 
accepted in a reasonable time was that the use of reliance as an enforce-
ment mechanism is decidedly one-sided, as it is easy for a general contrac-
tor to rely on a subcontractor's bid, but it is extremely difficult for a 
subcontractor to use reliance against a general contractor. Id. 
310. V.C.C. § 2-102 (1999) (stating that the Article applies to transactions in 
goods, unless the context requires otherwise). 
311. Joel R. Wolfson, Express Warranties and Published Information Content Under 
Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, 600 PU/Pat 317, 329 (2000). "Goods" are de-
fined as "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to 
the contract for sale." V.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
312. See, e.g., Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. 
Wis. 1974) (noting that the offer to supply pipes failed the requirements of 
V.C.c. § 2-205 and instead was enforced on the basis of promissory estop-
pel); Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 159-60, 674 A.2d at 529 (discussing 
V.C.C. § 2-205, but applying promissory estoppel instead). 
313. SWEET, supra note 2, at 626. 
314. Id.; see also SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 72. 
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ntles by which members must agree to abide.315 These rules require 
the orderly submission of bids by subcontractors to general contrac-
tors on a given date and prohibit subsequent price solicitations by all 
parties.316 Since subcontractors are required to file definitive sub-bids 
prior to the general contractor's opening of these sub-bids, there is no 
opportunity for "last minute haggling."317 Also, because any differ-
ence in price between the sub-bid and the price actually charged are 
likely to be detected, post-award bid peddling is limited.318 If the gen-
eral contractor awards any sub-bids to subcontractors who did not file 
with the depository, unsuccessful subcontractors can assume their bids 
have been used for bid shopping and refuse to submit bids to that 
contractor in the future. 3Ig Thus, nearly all depositories prohibit, by a 
number of methods, such evils as bid shopping in the bidding pro-
cess.320 Although this alternative is extremely attractive, it is prevent-
ative, rather than remedial, has antitrust implications,321 and is of no 
use once a bidding dispute has arisen outside of a depository. 
C. Statutory Rules 
State legislatures have also responded to the construction industry 
bidding dilemma by creating statutes that address the ills of bid shop-
ping and bid peddling.322 Nineteen states have statutes which require 
subcontractors to be listed on all bids for public construction 
projects.323 The statutes prohibit a general contractor from removing 
315. SWEET, supra note 2, at 626. 
316. George H. Schueller, Bid Depositories, 58 MICH. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (l960). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 499. 
320. See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 72-73. 
321. For cases addressing the antitrust implications of such ventures see Tekton, 
Inc. v. Builders Bid Service of Utah, Inc., 676 F.2d 1352 (lOth Cir. 1982) and 
Cullum Electric & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass 'n of South Caro .. 
lina, 436 F. Supp. 418 (D. S.C. 1976). 
322. See supra note 323; see also supra Part II.B. 
323. See ALAsKA STAT. § 36.30.115 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 22 .. 9 .. 204 
(Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104 (West Supp. 2000); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4b-95 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 
§§ 6911(1), 6904(b) (2) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.0515 (West 1999); 
HAw. REv. STAT. § 103D .. 302(b) (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 67 .. 2310 
(Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 18.6(13) (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-3741 (Supp. 1999); NEV. REv. STAT. § 338.141 (Supp. 1999); NJ. 
STAT. ANN. § 40A:ll .. 16 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-32 to 
13-4-43 (Michie 2000); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1735 (McKinney 1999 & 
Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-128(b) (Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 11 .. 35 .. 3020 (Law Co-op 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-6-119 (1997); UTAH 
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or replacing a subcontractor listed in a bid for a state contract, subject 
to certain exceptions.324 
For example, the California Legislature adopted the Subletting and 
Subcontracting Fair Practices Act.325 This Act provides that a general 
contractor on "any public work or improvement" must put in its main 
bid "the name and the location of the place of business of each sub-
contractor who will perform work ... in an amount in excess of one-
half of [one] percent" of the price of the main bid.326 The general 
contractor is also required to provide any other information re-
quested by an officer, department board, or commission, concerning 
any subcontractor who the general contractor is required to list.327 
Once a general contractor's bid on a public project has been ac-
cepted, the Act prohibits the general contractor from replacing any of 
the listed subcontractors, subject to nine exceptions.328 If a general 
CODE ANN. § 63A-5-208 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 39.30.060 (West 2000); see also Allen Holt Gwyn, A Review of Subcontractor-
Listing Statutes, 17 CONSTRUCTION LAw 35 (1997) (listing the nineteen stat-
utes and describing their requirements and differences). 
324. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.0515. See also infra note 328 for a list of 
usual exceptions. 
325. See CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4101-14. The reason for the enactment of this 
chapter was legislative findings that bid shopping and bid peddling can 
"often result in poor quality of material and workmanship to the detriment 
of the public, deprive the public of the full benefits of fair competition 
among [general] contractors and subcontractors, and lead to insolvencies, 
loss of wages to employees, and other evils." Id. at 4101; see also E.F. Brady 
Co. v. M.H. Golden Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 890-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that the Act was created to prevent bid shopping by general con-
tractors pressuring other subcontractors to submit lower bids and to pre-
vent bid peddling by unlisted subcontractors attempting to undercut 
known bids of listed subcontractors in order to obtain the sub-contract); 
supra Part II.B. 
326. CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104(a)(1). In the case of bids for the construc-
tion of streets, highways, and bridges, however, the subcontractor's work 
must either be in excess of one-half of one percent of the general contrac-
tor's total bid or in excess of $10,000, whichever is greater. Id. Also, no 
more than one subcontractor may be listed for each portion of the work. 
Id. § 4104(b). It is worth noting that the listing of a subcontractor, as re-
quired by the Act, does not create an express or implied contract between 
the general contractor and the subcontractor. E.F Brady Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 890. 
327. See CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104(a) (2) . 
328. Id. § 4107. The awarding authority: 
[M]ay consent to the substitution of the following [nine] situa-
tions: (1) When the subcontractor listed in the bid after having a 
reasonable opportunity to do so fails or refuses to execute a written 
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contractor violates these provisions, the awarding authority may can-
cel the contract or assess a penalty in an amount of not more than 
10% of the subcontract in question.329 The Supreme Court of Calif or-
nia has additionally held that public authorities have a duty to listed 
subcontractors not to consent to any wrongful substitutions of 
subcon tractors. 330 
Another state, New Mexico, has enacted the Subcontractors Fair 
Practices Act, which substantially mirrors the California statute.331 
However, the New Mexico statute adds the unique requirement that 
agencies employ alternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve 
bid shopping and bid peddling claims.332 
[d. 
contract, when the written contract ... is presented to the subcon-
tractor by the ... [general] contractor; (2) When the listed subcon-
tractor becomes bankrupt or insolvent; (3) When the listed 
subcontractor fails or refuses to perform his or her subcontract; (4) 
When the listed subcontractor fails or refuses to meet the bond 
requirements of the ... [general] contractor ... ; (5) When the ... 
[general] contractor demonstrates ... that the name of the sub-
contractor was listed as the result of an inadvertent clerical error; 
(6) When the listed subcontractor is not licensed ... ; (7) When 
the awarding authority ... determines that the work performed by 
the listed subcontractor is substantially unsatisfactory . . . ; (8) 
When the listed subcontractor is ineligible to work on a public 
works project ... ; (9) When the awarding authority determines 
that a listed subcontractor is not a responsible contractor. 
329. [d. § 4110. 
330. Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 981 (Cal. 
1969). 
331. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-31, 13-4-32, 13-4-34, 13-4-36 (Michie 1997); see 
also supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text. Again, based on findings 
that "the practice of bid shopping and bid peddling ... often result in poor 
quality of material and workmanship to the detriment of the public, de-
prive the public of the full benefits of fair competition among contractors 
and subcontractors and lead to insolvencies and loss of wages to employ-
ees," the Act prohibits a general contractor whose bid is accepted on any 
public works construction project from substituting a subcontractor in 
place of the subcontractor listed on the original bid. N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 13-4-32, 13-4-36. There are nine exceptions to this substitute prohibi-
tion. See id. § 13-4-36(A)(1)-(9). These nine exceptions follow almost ver-
batim the nine exceptions in the California statute. See supra note 328 and 
accompanying text. 
332. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-43. The statute states that once a valid claim has 
been established the agency may "(a) hold a public hearing for the purpose 
of providing an informal resolution of the dispute by preparing a 'form of 
dispute' which shall be available to all parties ... ; or (b) refer the matter in 
dispute to be resolved through arbitration." [d. 
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These laws offer a viable alternative to promissory estoppel. None-
theless, these statutes only regulate construction contracts for public 
projects,333 which are only a small percentage of overall construction 
contracts. 3M Therefore, in order to fully remedy the construction bid-
ding dilemma, the Maryland Legislature would have to create legisla-
tion applicable not only to public, but private construction contracts 
as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The construction industry's unique practices335 lend themselves to 
creative solutions.336 Promissory estoppel has been applied by some 
courts as an answer to dilemmas encountered in the construction in-
dustry bidding process.337 The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1996 
took what appeared to be an opportunity to resolve confusion over 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel and applied it as a creative solu-
tion to bidding disputes.338 Because of continued confusion,339 how-
ever, Maryland, contrary to other jurisdictions,34o currently fails to 
apply appropriately the doctrine of prommisory estoppeP41 and in-
stead follows a misinterpretation of section 90.342 The most appropri-
ate forum to resolve this problem is the court of appeals.343 
Therefore, when confronted with the correct factual scenario, the 
court must clarify its holding in Pavel Enterprises by applying the cor-
rect rationale for the Restatement's sections on promissory estoppe1.344 
Only through this clarification, or an alternative method,345 can a sub-
contractor's bid become irrevocable346 and a general contractor be 
prohibited from refusing to accept a sub-bid upon award of the main 
333. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
334. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 720 (1999). Government construction contracts accounted for 
22% of the $665 billion spent overall on construction in the United States 
in 1998. [d. 
335. See supra Part II.B. 
336. See supra Part II1.B. 
337. See supra Part II1.B. 
338. See supra Part II1.c.l. 
339. See supra Part II1.C.2. 
340. See supra Part II1.B.3.a-b. 
341. See supra Part II1A3.b, I1I.B.3.a-b. 
342. See supra Part II1.C.1-2. 
343. See supra Part IILC.2. 
344. See supra Part IILC.2. 
345. See supra Part IV. 
346. See supra Part I1LB.3.b. 
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contract.347 This would level the playing field between these two par-
ties and eliminate any continued exposure to risk.348 
Kai-Niklas A. Schneider 
347. See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
348. See supra Part III.B. 
